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CORRECTIONS TO TECHNICAL ERRORS IN APPEAL BRIEF
STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR CORRECTIONS:

In its answer brief to this appeal, appellee Audit & Accounting Authority, Ltd.
("Audit"), argued that appellant, Billie Murdock ("Murdock"), failed to include citations
to the record in her statement of the issues and statement of facts. Murdock, recognizing
this inadvertency, subsequently sought leave of Court to correct these technical errors
and to include such corrections in this her reply brief. By date of 2 August 1996, this
Court issued its Order granting Murdock's motion in this regard. 1 Accordingly, those
corrections are set forth respectively as follows:

A copy of that Order is annexed hereto at Tab 1.
l

RECORD CITATIONS PERTAINING TO THE STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

ISSUE N O . 1: Did the circuit court err by restricting the time for trial and thereby
deprive Defendant of fundamental due process under section one of the fourteenth
amendment to the U. S. Constitution, and Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah?
See Pretrial Transcript ("P.T."), dated 10 December 1993, page 5, lines 10-12; p. 13,
lines 12-13; and p. 15, lines 13-20 (Record Index ["R.Idx."] 244. 261 [originally 304. 321],
wherein the court below deemed appropriate a half-day trial setting. See also P.T., dated
28 October 1994, page 3, lines 14-20; p. 5, lines 13-16; p. 6, lines 19-20; and p. 7, lines 2-4
(R.Idx., 262. 269 [originally 322. 329], wherein the court continued this line of reasoning.
This issue arose from the fact that the court, only on the day of trial, telephonically
communicated that it was arbitrarily restricting the time for trial to one hour
notwithstanding its prior statements on the record to the contrary during the preceding
year upon which Defendant had relied.
ISSUE N O . 2: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where
Defendant had previously raised, in her amended Answer pleadings pursuant to Rule
8(c), U.R.C.P., the affirmative defense that Plaintiff's claims were stale and thus barred
by the doctrine of waiver, laches, and estoppel?
See Defendant's Amended Answer and Counterclaim (Second), "Seventh
Affirmative Defense," page 5 (R.Idx., 68. 103 [originally 125. 160]). See also, Reporter's
Trial Transcript ("R.T."), page 64, lines 21-25; page 72, lines 20-25; p. 73, lines 10-12; p.
74, lines 14-17; and pp. 77-78, lines 25, 1, respectively (R.Idx., 270. 372 [originally 330.
431]).
ISSUE N O , 3: Did the circuit court err by denying Defendant equal protection
under the law where it awarded assignee Plaintiff the benefit of interest pursuant to
Assignor's contract while precluding Defendant from calculating like interest amounts
pursuant to her unambiguous contract upon which Assignor had previously defaulted
in order to obtain an equal, or greater, offset against assignee Plaintiff's claims as
provided pursuant to Rule 13(c), U.R.C.P.?

ii

See R.I., p. 76, hue 22, and R. I

m. 78-79, 'lines 9-25 and 1-3, respectively (K Idw,

7MZ).
isSLL No. i. t >id tiie circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where it
calculated Plaintiff's claims by relying on defense exhibit incorporating Assignor's
unproven amounts in light of finding that Plaintiff's case suffered from lack of adequate
evidence in the record?
So*» I" l

T1
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i f h n m o l i |i
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ISSU E I" I C. r»: Did the circuit court err by finding that Defendant had failed to
prove Mby a preponderance of the evidence/' that she had a cause of action pursuant to
the FDCPA and the UCSPA where she was precluded from prosecuting her claims
thereunder as the proximate result of the time restraints imposed for trial?
See R.T., p. 85, line^ 17-25 and p 86, lines 1-25; R.'I. v 99, lines 12-16 (R.Idx., Id).
MY: \ * w i : \ -ONS PERTAIN IIV

. . . : - .

j . ng

Si \ H M I N I OF THE FACTS

"1 he tails sel toilli in Part . > wi mis appea. u^ai solely *

"^tters regarding the

claims in Plaintiff's complaint and Uetendant's ucienses and counterclaims thereto'. Part
B hereof deals with the subject matter of Defendant's counterclaim which seeks reliet tor
Plaintiffs alleged violations of t; .

*•«

it

claims under the UCSPA, (See R.ldx . 1. J and lb. 39. [originally 12. 35.], respectively,
i\ hii li was suhse(|in*n(l\ liiurndod as. sel I "ll I1'-.1! 'V | Mlhough lln Llauns under' both
Part A and Part B necessarily arise from., the same disputed transactions, the tw o Parte
boai II Iuj',11 nil ioldtionship to each illi mi

"I "mill respect to T art . , .ne facts date from

Assignor's default on Defendant's Contract for postage and mailing equipment, executed
31 March 1982, and subsequent events related thereto. (See 4-page Hxhibit incorporated

2

See footnote #1 at p. 3 of Murdock's appeal brief citing appropriate authority in
support of this statement.

in Murdock's appeal brief entitled "Sales Agreement," "Delivery Receipt," etc., about
which she testified and ultimately prevailed upon at trial wherein the court below
awarded her a principal-only amount in offset [See R.T., p. 10, lines 12-15; R.T., pp. 7611, lines 21-25 and 1, respectively], yet disallowed admission of these very same
documents into evidence thereby effectively precluding any award of offsetting interest.)
These events eventually culminated in Assignor's assigning to Plaintiff the alleged debt
purported to be owed by Defendant and ultimately resulted in the instant litigation now
on appeal here. (See R.T., p. 22, lines 5-8; 17-19 [R.Idx., Id.]) With respect to Part B, the
facts stem from Plaintiff's initial communication to Defendant, dated 8 May 1991, as a
third-party debt collector, (See Defendant's Exhibit A of her Amended Answer and
Counterclaim [Second] R.Idx., 68. 103 [originally 125. 160], and events transpiring
thereafter, all of which Defendant alleges violated the FDCPA and give rise to the
additional protections afforded pursuant to the UCSPA. This appeal raises five (5)
principal issues for review by this Court. The first issue relates to both Part A and Part
B. Issues #2 through #4, inclusive, relate to Part A only, while Issue #5 relates solely to
Part B.
ARGUMENT IN REPLY
POINT t Having complied herein consistent with this Court's Order of 2 August
1996, referenced above, the first point argued in Audit's answer brief is thus rendered
moot and no further reply is necessary.
POINT IL Here, Audit's argument, while technically correct in the strict legal sense,
is largely inapplicable under the facts of this case owing to the uncertainty of whether,
at any given point during trial, the court had deemed the case concluded, or whether
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further proceedings were going to be entertained. Owing to this uncertainty, it was
simply not possible to determine the court's intentions in this regard ahead of time and
it would have been untimely to object to the arbitrary shortening of the time for trial if,
in fact, sufficient time to fully argue the issues were going to be made available after all.3
This uncertainty is made further evident where, at one point during trial while
the parties and the coxirt were discussing the payments made by Murdock to Audit's
Assignor, the court began to make what appeared at the outset to be a clarifying
statement in that regard, but concluded in a ruling instead,

(See generally, R.T.,

beginning at p. 71, line 12, through p. 74, line 10), which ultimately resulted in the
pronouncement of final judgment. (See R.T., p. 78, lines 3-9.) Yet, after bidding all
present "...[a] very happy holiday season" in seeming conclusion, whereupon Murdock
reminded the court of her counterclaim under the FDCPA, the court then conceded to
grant a limited hearing of the issue which is made evident by its preemptory request
that Murdock "...[j]ust give me a Reader's Digest — what do you believe — what is the
conduct that violated the --." (R.T., p. 86, lines 17-19.)
Even so, however, upon Murdock's attempt to comply with the court's express
request for a "Reader's Digest" version of Audit's conduct that is alleged to have violated
the provisions of the FDCPA, the court, in fact, cut off that very attempt at explanation
in mid-sentence at the outset by stating "...[I]'ve got your counterclaim and exhibits."
(R.T., p. 86, lines 24-25). Thus, it continued to remain unclear whether the court was
going to allow the time necessary for Murdock to fully prosecute her counterclaim under

3

In this regard, see, for example, R.T., p. 34, lines 21-22: "I'm going to give you five
more minutes to get moving on this trial." But see, R.T., p. 54, lines 5-6: "Okay. I
wanted to — in case we don f t finish this today, which I doubt we are."
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the FDCPA, as duly contemplated by that federal statute, thereby precluding, once again,
the wisdom of objecting to the shortening of time at this point as well where it had not
yet become an established fact.
Repeated further attempts by Murdock to provide the requested "condensed
version" of the claims set forth in her counterclaim were only met with continued
interruptions by the court 4 Such actions by the court constituted a complete reversal of
its prior ruling near the outset of trial proceedings. At that point, where the court was
deciding the merits of the motion in limine put forth by Audit, the court ruled, in
pertinent part, as follows:
"Certainly I'm not going to forgo (sic) Mr. Stanton [Murdock] from
asserting as a defense, or offset the claims even though they may not be —
even if they could not be asserted as a separate action. ..." (R.T., p. 10,
lines 12-15.)
Thus, the court's later actions during trial clearly operated in diametric opposition to this
prior ruling which ultimately served to preclude Murdock from fully asserting her
defenses and prosecuting her counterclaims under the FDCPA as the direct and
proximate result of the uncertain, often interrupted, and hurried nature of the trial,
which is abundantly evident throughout the entirety of the abbreviated trial proceedings
and duly reflected in the record.
To the extent the foregoing facts, and actions of the court, bear weight in
mitigation of Murdock's inadvertent failure to expressly object, on the record, to the
shortening of time for trial owing largely to such circumstances, thus remains for this
Court to determine. However, the Court, in its discretion, may decide a case upon any

4

The facts pertaining to this issue are discussed more fully in Point VI hereinafter.
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points that its proper disposition may require, even if first raised in a reply brief.
Romrell x. Zion's First National Bank, N. A., 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah, 1980), citing
Bardeen v. Commander

Oil Co., 48 Cal.App.2d 355, 119 P.2d 967 (1941).

As this issue presents several questions of fundamental due process arising under
both the Federal and State Constitutions, as amply reflected in the record, it is likewise
well-settled that appellate courts have the ultimate power to conduct an independent
review of federal constitutional claims. City of St George v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929, 932
(Utah, 1993), citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2615, 37 L.Ed.2d
419 (1973). Those constitutional guarantees should not be subverted or diminished by
the inadvertent

failure of any party to strictly comply with tenets of pure legal

technicality, such as mere failure to object on the record to the shortening of time for
trial — particularly where the constitutional aspects of such shortening of time only
became apparent after the trial had ultimately concluded.
POINT l i t Here, Audit argues: "There is no citation to the record of any place
where the words waiver, laches, or estoppel appear except to mention the amended
answer," and cites a 1991 decision of this Court in support of that contention. This
Court, however, later addressed more precisely the point Audit here argues where, in
a contract action like this one, it was subsequently determined that it is the actions of
the parties, as found by the trial court, rather than specific use of the words, which
controls in whether these requirements are met. In Pasker, Gould, Ames & Weaver v«
Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 876 (Ut.Ct.App., 1994), this Court held as follows:
,!

...[W]hile the trial court did not specifically use the word "waiver," the
actions of the parties — as found by the trial court — meet the requirements
for waiver."
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This Court then went on to explain just what constitutes the elements necessary to
constitute waiver and held that in order to so determine, the court looks at the totality
of the circumstances involved. Id., at 876.
Applying this same rationale to the instant case on appeal, it is equally clear that
the actions of the parties, particularly the actions of Audit's Assignor, as found by the
court, likewise meet the essential elements necessary to meet the requirements for laches.
Further, it cannot be doubted that the elements necessary to constitute laches were thus
raised to a level of consciousness of the court where the court itself discussed those very
elements in its findings (R.T., p. 72, lines 1-14), even though the word "laches" was not
specifically mentioned, and particularly in light of the fact that both Audit and Murdock
had previously testified (R.T., p. 32, lines 20-24, and p. 42, line 25, respectively), with
Audit further stipulating (R.T., p. 33, lines 9-10), that the events and circumstances in the
case at hand originated some 12 years earlier, or nearly a decade prior to Assignor's
instant assignment of its alleged claims to Audit. This issue is argued more fully in
Issue #2 of her appeal brief.
Because Murdock properly claimed the affirmative defense of laches in her
amended answer, as Audit here points out, and where the court had previously ruled
that it was not going to forego the assertion of her claims as a defense, and where the
court further found the essential elements present which constitute the requirements for
laches, even though that word was not specifically mentioned, Murdock duly met her
obligation to preserve this issue on appeal with or without further request. Considered
in light of the totality of these circumstances the trial court erred in granting judgment
and Audit's action should be held barred as the doctrine of laches commands. The
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judgment should be reversed and vacated on those grounds.
POINT W; Audit's argument here, addressing the issue surrounding Murdock's
1982 contract upon which Audit's Assignor had originally defaulted, asserting that:
"Appellant has not established a right to offset the judgment with interest allegedly due
to defendant," and claiming that a ruling to that effect was not obtained during trial, is
unfounded where Audit overlooks, again, the fact of the court's prior ruling, indicated
above. (R.T., p. 10, lines 12-15 Ibid).5

Audit also overlooks the fact of Murdock's

testimony at trial concerning such contract and the coxirt's acknowledgment of it at that
time.

(R.T., pp. 42-43, lines 5-25, 1-2, respectively; p. 53, lines 15-18.)

That

acknowledgment was further established where Murdock was awarded a principal-only
amount therefor in offset against Audit's claims.
Audit also argues in this point concerning an evidentiary ruling at a side bar
conference and cites a case in support of that proposition claiming "that case is
controlling here," alleging that no ruling to that effect (the admissibility of Murdock's
contract) appears on the record. This is simply not true and the record, in fact, indicates
to the contrary where every other document submitted a n d / o r testified to by Murdock
at trial was subsequently admitted into evidence except for her contract. Thus it cannot
logically be argued or even assumed that the issue was waived. It likewise cannot be
doubted that Murdock argued for admission of her chief piece of evidence, or in the
alternative, if the same were not admitted that no interest be awarded under Assignor's
contract as well, where the court summarized thereafter, on the record, the substance of

5

See ante, page 3 herein.
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the sidebar discussions 6 and the reasoning behind its ruling in that respect.
Audit concludes this point by stating: "Not having claimed the offset in the
pleadings and having failed to offer the contract into evidence on the record or to obtain
a ruling on the record, Defendant can not claim the evidence was improperly excluded."
Having just argued in reply to the latter part of this statement, only the first part
merits further discussion. By Audit's statement: "Not having claimed the offset in the
pleadings,..." it again ignores the fact of the court's prior ruling to the contrary which,
in fact, entitled Murdock to offset against Audit's claims. Audit's statement in this
regard cannot be read to exclude relevant evidence (i'e., her contract with Audit's
Assignor), which was subsequently discovered only many months after Murdock's
amended answer and counterclaim had been drafted and filed; in fact, nearly a year
after.7 Nevertheless, a copy of the same was timely provided to Audit with her witness
and documents list required to be exchanged by the parties prior to trial as ordered by
the court. As this evidence was duly presented, testified to, and considered by the court
at trial, as both the record and the judgment plainly reflect, it was plain error for the
court below to subsequently exclude its admission as evidence; the same constituting an
abuse of discretion, the error not being harmless.
Thus, where the court erred by improperly excluding the admission of Murdock's

6

For quotations by the court and citations to the record on this point, see indented
paragraphs appearing on pp. 25-25 of Murdock's appeal brief. (R.T., pp. 78-78, lines 9-25
and 1-13, respectively. Ibid)
7

To eventually discover the original contract required an extensive search through
more than a dozen years' accumulation of business and personal records. Not having
this evidence in hand at the time the pleadings were drafted, nor any assurance that it
could ever be located at this late date, necessarily precluded its inclusion.
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contract from evidence, Audit's concluding statement in this point succinctly identifies
the very heart of this issue on appeal: "Without that evidence, there [was] no basis for
the trial court to assess interest on the contract.

On that basis, no offset could be

allowed." Accordingly, to the extent the court's award on Murdock's excluded contract
of a principal-only amount in offset against Audit's claims constituted an "interpretation"
as a matter of law without regard for extrinsic evidence, the court's interpretation should
be afforded no particular weight on appeal. Seashores, Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647
(Ut.Ct.App., 1987).
POINT V: In this point, Audit largely postulates its own theories as to what
constitutes the appropriate standard of review applicable to Issue #4 in Murdock's
appeal brief, presupposing the same to be one of finding of fact when, in actuality, the
question presents a conclusion of law as to whether Audit failed to prove its prima facie
case, Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah

Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141,1144 (Ut.Ct.App., 1994);

Handy v. Union Vac. R R, 841 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Ut.Ct.App., 1992), and is therefore
reviewable by this Court for correction of the trial court's conclusions and calculations.
Wade v. Standi 869 P.2d 9,12 (Ut.Ct.App., 1994); McMahanv.Dees,

873 P.2d 1172,1175

(Ut.Ct.App., 1994).
In any lawsuit, the burden of proof is incumbent upon the plaintiff.

In the

instant case, the record reflects that Audit received assignment of Assignor's claim on
25 April 1991. (R.T., p. 22, lines 20-21.) Audit filed suit dated 27 July 1992 and the
complaint alleged "...[tjhe amount due as of November 4,1991 is the sum of $3,976.74."
(R.Idx., p. 1, para. 3.) At the end of Part A of the trial the court concluded the final
judgment to be $528.00, plus interest. Thus, Audit clearly failed to prove its prima facie
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case even though it was the prevailing party.
Because Audit's failure to carry this burden was largely overcome solely by the
court's conclusion (i.e., to accept the "highest gross amount" it could find anywhere in
the documents submitted by either party during the past decade [i.e., $5,328.00] as a
valid beginning point upon which to base its calculations in arriving at the final
judgment amount of $528.00) rather than by proving its own prima facie case; and,
where the court adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law which incorporated a
theoretical example only of interest calculations ultimately prepared and submitted by
Murdock at the court's post-trial invitation to do so which stemmed from her objections
to Audit's prior proposed interest calculations; and, where the court improperly excluded
Murdock's contract from evidence thus precluding the calculation of interest amounts
in offset, the court's conclusions and calculations should be reviewed for correctness.
POINT VL

In this point, Audit argues: "Defendant's failure to prove her

counterclaim is adequately supported by the record."

In support of that argument,

Audit further states: "...[t]he record contains several incidences of the trial court inviting
the Defendant to offer more evidence or argument on her counterclaim," then merely
cites a few of the examples argued in Issue #5 of Murdock's appeal brief in order to
assert an opposite conclusion to those set out by her.
As this issue is fully argued in her brief, no further response in that regard is
necessary in this reply brief. However, it is important to point out here some matters
of equal relevance with respect to this issue. As Audit is a collection agency, per se, it
is an entity governed by both federal and state statutes and implementing regulations,
and the courts are bound to take judicial notice thereof. Accordingly, to the extent the
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trial court's findings as to the issues presented under the FDCPA constituted an
interpretation of the same, those findings and interpretations present a question of law
which are proper!) reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1357 (Utah,
1993) (whether trial court correctly interprets statute is question of law to be reviewed
for correctness).
In Issue #5 of her appeal brief, Murdock cites several instances on the record
which clearly constitute an interpretation by the court of the provisions of the FDCPA.
In addition, she also clearly identifies how the actions of Audit inflicted against her
during the pendency of this action constitute express violations of the FDCPA where
similar issues have been decided by numerous federal and state appellate courts. As
Congress clearly intended to make an aggrieved consumer, such as Murdock in this case,
the primary self-enforcement mechanism under the provisions of the FDCPA, she is
plainly entitled to the protections afforded thereby as well as to those contained in the
UCSPA as contemplated by that federal statute.
For, as the Utah Supreme Court has said:
"Legal determinations are defined as 'those which are not of fact but are
essentially of rules or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar
qualities and status in similar circumstances'." State v. Vena, 869 P.2d 932,
935 (Utah, 1994).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the court below should be
reversed and vacated.

Attorney for Appellant
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AUG 0 2 1996
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Wa%i M. Sranch
^ of the court
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Audit & Accounting Authority
Ltd., a Utah corporation,

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 950409-CA

Billie Murdock,
Defendant and Appellant

This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion,
filed July 11, 1996, for permission to correct a technical error
in her brief. Appellee did not object or otherwise respond to
the motion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted, with
appellant to include the correction in appellant's reply brief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellant's reply brief shall be filed
within thirty (3 0) days of the date of this order.

9
Dated this >-

A*

day of August, 1996

FOR THE COURT:

JJ
&U.
Russell W. Bench, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on August 2, 1996, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
Daniel A. Stanton
Aron Stanton, P.C.
Attorney at Law for Appellant
352 Denver Street #226
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John G. Mulliner
Attorney at Law for Appellee
363 No. University Avenue, Suite #103
P.O. Box 1045
Provo, UT 84603
Dated this 2nd day of August, 1996.

By

W//,,: / ^
" Deputy Clerk

Case No. 950409-CA

/-/Q-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that this day I caused to be delivered to the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals an original hereof together with seven (7) true and correct copies, and that I
mailed this day two (2) copies hereof, true and correct, to Plaintiff's counsel, first-class
postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
John G. Mulliner
363 N. University Ave., Suite 103
P. O. Box 1045
Provo, Utah 84603
DATED this "£ day of September, 1996.

